

THE
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THEORY OF VALUE AND CONSCIENCE IN THEIR
BIOLOGICAL CONTEXT.

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It is a besetting fault of our constructive thinking to overestimate the load which a distinction will carry. We prove that conscience is uniquely different from the calculus of values and think we have saved ethics. We discover that theoretical judgments and judgments of appreciation are fairly independent, and hasten to found philosophies of religion upon the breach. With these and other dichotomies we renew the experience that unless we have something more than a difference, what we accomplish is simply to insulate our ethics and our religion. What tempts us repeatedly into this dead corner is, I believe, the conviction that mind must be studied on its own ground: whereas the truth is that regarded thus intimately and ideally the objects of our inner experience tend to fall into just these fruitless disparities.¹ In my own attempts to gain relief from such situations I have found myself moving, more or less clearly, in the direction of physical theory.

¹The more contemporary psychology exerts itself to be purely experiential, the more it finds itself busied in listing the 'irreducible' elements of the mind. This is true particularly of German psychology where good judgment is less likely to interfere with consistency of method. It might save some trouble to observe that all aspects of the mind as pure experience are irreducible. Pleasure is pleasure; Begriff is Begriff; reason is reason; nothing is identical with anything else—not even with the aggregate of its elements; everything is simple and unique. It is well to note this truth,—to insist on it is to spin on our boot-heels. An irreducible is an object of which we can only say that it is what it is; of this material no science can be made. The tendency which isolates these objects has something idealistic about it, perhaps; but since it has nothing but the 'given' to offer, it is necessarily dogmatic and exclamatory. Only a genuine idealism can afford to be thoroughly materialistic in its first explanations.

I have come to believe that there is a certain inevitable logic in this. Our inner experiences, our oughts, our happinesses, our values, even our pleasures among themselves, must as objects of thought remain miscellaneous furniture, each turning its back to the other in default of common understanding, unless we can bring some finely indifferent unit of order and comparison into them. The first business of all explanation is to express a thing in terms of what it is not—an event in terms of its cause, truth in terms of process, sensation in terms of motion. Other things equal, the more alien in nature the terms in which a thing is expressed the more successful the explanation: the thing has its roots in the utmost corners of reality—the demonstration is complete.¹ Now nothing is so admirable in its categorical indifference to the concerns of the spirit as is physical nature. It has no member either in the psychical movement or influenced by it. It is a seamless garment of interweaving threads; it is what the mathematician calls, in a word, a closed group, and the physicist, a conservative system. This complete conceptual independence it is which chiefly qualifies it for serving as a terminus of explanations for the peculiarities of spirit. Its alien quality (once it is admitted to be a part of the same world with spirit) insures that no aspect of consciousness will be unrepresented in the physical system; there will be nothing even in the relation of consciousness to its world of objects and to other subjects which is not shown in its field by some exact metaphor. That is to say,—the elements of consciousness which on their own separate ground are mutually repellent, find themselves mirrored in a homogeneous world no part of which can get out of relation to any other, and from which, therefore, if we have the key to the metaphor, those relations can be read and understood.

But this logical hint is enforced by a more substantial consideration. It is reasonable to suppose that the answer to any question will be found in the context of the phenomenon that calls forth the question. There are good grounds for thinking that whatever plurality the mind

¹ The difficulty always is to see that such explanations explain. To explain a thing by what it is not—that is to explain one mystery by another. But is there nothing illuminating about that? The company which miseries are said to love lightens them; mysteries love company also, and for a similar reason. If we are satisfied to look no longer for the supports of the earth because a group of unsupported planets can be self-supporting we must be prepared to recognize similar relations among facts. Every datum, taken alone, is dark, just because it is ultimate. This stranding upon 'data' is empiricism's weak spot, and its opportunity. The thing that relieves data of darkness is, not more data exactly, but the group-form into which data assemble themselves.

shows, whatever temporal movement and flux, is due to its entanglement in nature; or, to read the same relation from the other end, nature may be the temporal and plural life of the mind. So of each several aspect of the mind. Conscience, for instance, has no variety, no application, no career, except for its commerce with our 'empirical' instincts and desires; and desire, in turn, has no variety nor development, except in the toils of a differentiating organism. Very probably, also, conscience splits off from desire or desire from conscience on some rock of nature. Hence, without any assumption as to which of the two, nature or mind, is the prime mover in this differentiating process, we should naturally look for our principles of synthesis in that same region of things which reveals the cleavages. Genetic surveys have always the advantage of showing the emergence of the thing in its 'natural' relations — in the case of conscience, for instance, it will be found in the company of those desires and impulses with which it is destined to concern itself as regulator. Nature can give no sign of conscience except in the midst of its business. We have not first to deduce the thing and then its application; but if we find it at all, we shall find the application first and the thing in the heart of the application.

Now what we need above all things to make nature eloquent of mind is a distinction of categories. Not every aspect of consciousness is represented in the physical context by a separate organ or process; we must be ready to appeal to the higher physical categories, the configurations of organs and processes, accelerations of processes, and other differentials and modifications of energy. What nature shows us is not simply a metaphor of consciousness (and hardly that — for its language is all but literal), but it shows us a finished *analysis* of consciousness. We know that whereas in itself pleasure is simple, conscience is simple, and nature is simple, the attempt to express one in terms of another brings out the subtleties of each; and we shall not expect to find every unitary mental state marked out in the body by tangibly colligated physiological phenomena. We should be guided much more truly by the principle that psychical categories are complementary to physical categories. The first aspect of a psychical *one* will be a physical *many*; this physical many will have its physical unity also, but that unity will be found in physical functions which are the more derivative in proportion as the psychical category is more substantial. The unity of the 'self' may thus be the last thing for which the simple physical expression is found, though that simple expression necessarily exists. The processes which belong to a self are naturally more widely dispersed and more various than those which belong to

such imperfect and fragmentary unities within a self as 'an experience,' 'an idea,' 'a pleasure,' etc.¹

The term 'idea' however will play a constant rôle in the theory I have to propose, and it will be desirable to sketch its physical interpretation before attempting the special question of the nature of value-experience. I shall attempt in the end to show, through these physical expressions, that values and conscience are functions in the life of 'ideas,' and to point out definitely, in the same language, what these functions are. Our disjointed world of facts, appreciations, and duties, may then be seen in some intelligible shape and connection on a basis other than metaphysical, though at every point the shapes of nature are but the intaglio of the spirit.

I. THE BIOLOGICAL EQUIVALENT OF 'IDEA.'

If our interpretation of freedom is valid,² the fact that any given physiological apparatus works 'mechanically' creates no presumption that it is unaccompanied by consciousness. Consciousness is not introduced into the biological series at the point where mechanism fails to meet the needs of adjustment, because there is no such point. Hence 'instincts,' however truly explained as congeries of simple automatisms

¹ In the interpretation of the *freedom* of consciousness we have a clear case of the complementary nature of physical and psychical categories. The freedom and initiative of consciousness is represented in nature by the obedient regularity, sometimes called the necessity, of physical sequence. This is the only basis upon which the relation of the free spirit to nature can be made intelligible. In a machine whose parts have any slack or lost motion the eye will discover the origin of pushes and pulls by the direction of the slack. But in a machine all of whose connections are perfect, so that there is not even infinitesimal slack in any part, it is impossible for observation to discover whether the wheel is pulling the piston or the piston pushing the wheel. Nature as a mechanism certainly offers no visible suggestion as to the seat of its original impulses; it simply goes its perfect way; and this alone it is which enables me to accept unreservedly the testimony of consciousness that itself is the active and original thing in the world, all else being ultimately passive. With this understanding the chief difficulty in all biological accounts of conscience is relieved — how, namely, out of natural law, that is, out of absolute obedience, can come the dictator. It is just because nature is the region of perfect obedience that the dictator has to 'come out.' In all strictness, dictatorship is simply the permanent outside of nature; and nature gives birth to conscience as it were, by way of confession. What we see in nature is the gradual perfection of the receiving organ, so that freedom acquires growing significance as life moves on; but some receiving organ is always there, the regular is the continuous signature of the free. We have therefore *no separate place* to make in our account of value or conscience for freedom, since it is completely expressed in the character which makes nature nature.

² See preceding note.

of tropic character, may at the same time represent some element of consciousness. Such an element would necessarily be a 'universal' or general idea; for the instinct is related not to individual objects, but to a type or class of objects, in such wise that *whatever* object affords the proper stimulus releases the appropriate action. To consciousness the stimulus would appear not as 'this individual object' but rather as 'a specimen of this *kind* of thing' toward which such and such a line of action is desirable.

The repetition of the stimulus would present to consciousness 'another specimen of the same type,' and the similarity of response might connect itself for that consciousness with some quality common to the two particular objects; but we who look on can see that the *identity of the idea* lies not primarily in any objective characters of the two experiences, but rather in something which the organism carries around with it, and which exists when there are no 'experiences' to set off its train of behavior. I wish to show not only that there is a biological equivalent for the permanent identity (sometimes called the 'timelessness') of the idea, and for the native difference between an idea and 'an experience,' but also to show that the idea has a more continuous presence in consciousness than the experiences in which it is subsumed from time to time. An idea is in fact never absent from consciousness; the prevalent belief that it vanishes and reappears is a confusion between the idea and the experience. Recognitions of objects are intermittent; but our ideas, it should be evident, are not what we think *of*, they are what we think *with*. Now whatever else the unity of a consciousness may mean, it also means that there is no isolated action of ideas, but that I think with all of them at once in each moment, though the 'bearing' of any given idea upon any given experience may be very remote.

But beside the ideas that correspond to instincts, that is, to the various modes of regular, quasi-official dealing with objects, there is a set of ideas of a different sort, which I may call the *field-ideas*, such as the idea of extension, or the physical continuum, or of a particular friendship, or that important symbolic idea 'the whole of things.' These do not correspond to any outlinable instincts; their biological expression must be sought elsewhere. But inasmuch as the field-ideas develop in close concomitance with the development of the instincts, the nature of the biological expression may appear by considering the *interaction* of instinct-ideas in the course of evolution.

The evolution of ideas in its most general biological character may be summarized as a matter of the *balancing of instincts* — that is, of

the emergence of 'secondary' or counter-instincts, which act together with the 'primary' instincts as more general instincts than either alone. Such a pair will be represented in consciousness by a more general idea. Now we have to note that every time one instinct has been balanced by another, consciousness has acquired not only a new type or class of objects, but also an idea of much greater scope than that corresponding to either of the two instincts separately. Just as my present impulse cannot be checked by the suggestion of something future without making me aware not merely of the two points in time, but more or less dimly of the stretch of time between; so the generalized habit of modifying the present impulse by the consideration of future contingencies cannot be established without making the idea of the *time-field* a correspondingly firm element of my conscious vista. So in proportion as I learn to modify my reflex upon what is here by the suggestion of what is not here, the idea of *space* becomes a mastered range of mental vision. The logic of the process is this: that whenever an *x* meets its non-*x*, *x* having been my largest class, the two can coexist in the same mind only as parts of some 'universe of discourse' whose scope will in general be very much greater than *x*. The development of an inhibitory instinct, therefore, can never mean the setting of one suggestion against another simply, but it means opening a whole field of possible variations where before there was but one fixed line. This whole process of balancing instincts, impulses, suggestions and associations means that the mental range is becoming more complete. Man's peculiarity in biological terms is his extraordinary balance — throughout his being he stands on two feet. It is this same peculiarity which in psychical terms is expressed in his extraordinary capacity for gripping large totals, and at last for coming to use the category 'the whole.' The use of this category is reason.¹

Now any one of these vista- or field-ideas, as we may call them, varies greatly in vividness. This vividness will be a function of the intensity of the *x*-impulse and also of the intensity of the non-*x* suggestion. The consciousness of time, for instance, is made vivid by the conflict between the claims of a pungent present and a pungent future. Let me suggest that a vivid representation of a future moment and therewith of the time-field, whether voluntary or resultant, stands for an expenditure of actual physical energy; and that the continuous and

¹The effect of the counter-instinct in developing a field-idea shows itself in the phenomenon of *hesitation*. Now the resultant of two instincts is just as determinate as the action of one. Hesitation means not that two possibilities interact, but that a range of possibilities has to be run over as a relatively independent object. Man's fitness for reason is concomitant with his preëminent fitness for hesitation.

easy presence of future and past to our vision represents a high level of potential energy in the nervous elements concerned. In general, I would propose that the extent of the ideal-whole in whose presence a conscious being lives and to which he adjusts his action is biologically represented by the potential energy of the nervous centers.

II. THE THEORY OF VALUE-EXPERIENCE.

The earliest and simplest instincts seem to be of such sort that the 'perception' of the stimulus and the 'gratification' of the instinct are one and the same process. Dealing with its object either by contact or by immediate reaction the subsumption of the general idea *is* the satisfaction. Despite the immense veiling of the phenomena of pleasure and pain by the complexities of development, the profuse demarcation of states of consciousness as 'ideas' which are neither instinct-ideas nor field-ideas but perhaps fragments thereof, I believe it can be shown that all pleasure is still of the nature either of subsumption (wherein an idea, or a conceptual whole, is applied to one of its instances) or of induction (wherein some instance or series of instances are provided with a conceptual whole which covers them). The joy of making a successful induction and the satisfaction which a child takes in applying a new word, are typical of all our positive values.

I cannot here make attempt to cover the field of value-experience, nor to account for all the well-known anomalies of our feelings of pleasure and pain. I shall review simply in very rough outline a series of phenomena which seem to me fundamental in the sense that any theory which will explain them will explain the rest in the long run.

1. Pleasures connected immediately with the senses and with the several physiological functions have their marked rhythmic intervals; and the longer the period of intermittency, the greater, in general, the volume of the pleasure (Spencer). This dimension of pleasure seems to be a function of the nutrition of the organs concerned.

2. Pleasure is itself a destructive and exhausting process. This is a natural inference from (1). Pleasure heightens life—that is, it quickens expense; it draws living to a focus as a flame creates its own draught. The intensity of a pleasure varies directly with the rate of destructive metabolism.

Pleasure may 'accompany states in which the organism is being built up' (Royce, and many others); but the process of building up is incidental to the pleasure itself, a biologically fortunate incident indeed, but having no representation in consciousness. The actual

succoring of the organism occurs later in time than the pleasure and affects first of all parts quite different from those concerned in the pleasure. In the long run pleasure is normally profitable to the organism; it usually accompanies only such expense as the body is happy to restore; the drain affects primarily funds which have been appropriated for that particular purpose; and these circumstances have something to do with differentiating pleasurable expense from painful expense. But *per se*, pleasure is a drain.

This is a clear instance of the complementary relation between physical and psychical categories above noticed. As an experience, pleasure is indeed a filling up of the cup, the supplying of a need. And the deeper the draft upon vital resources, the greater the fulfilment of desire. This holds true to the limit. Only that delight can ultimately satisfy and fill the soul which drains the body to the point of death. Indeed, all joy is akin to death; the fortunate drone unites with the queen, and dies — a rapport symbolic of all pleasure.

It is, in part, confusion between these inverse psychical and physical categories which has misled so many of the best observers into the belief that pleasure is a psychical accompaniment of physiological construction. It is extremely doubtful whether such construction enters into consciousness at all.

3. It follows from (2) that the expense in pleasure is not confined to the organ immediately concerned with the object which is the occasion of the pleasure. To a certain degree, change of object will renew pleasure, and variety of object preserve it; but there is evidently a common store which every pleasure draws upon, independent of the particular organ or object. A person thoroughly exhausted in one joy is ready to enjoy nothing else but Nirvana.

4. The quality, 'pleasure,' is a function neither of the special nor of the general exhausting process alone, but of some relation between them. Pleasure is at the same time a *central* and a peripheral experience.

In psychical language, pleasure requires attention. The physiological design of consciousness must be one of concentration. However wide the range of a person's affairs his whole interest must be recalled to the simplest experience he would enjoy. The process of 'becoming absorbed,' let us say in music, is at first a conflict with the inertia of other trends of interest: they must all fall into line at last. The intensity of the pleasure depends upon the perfection of the focus, that is, upon the absence of competition among objects of attention. The person is *all in the pleasure*, no matter if it be a 'mere' sensation.

5. But if it is important for the perfection of the experience that other interests cease to compete, it is equally important that they continue to exist. The quantity of the pleasure depends on the completeness of the recall, but it also depends on the presence of interests to be recalled. Pleasure is a function not simply of the fact of focus, but also of the amount of stuff concerned in the focusing. In this respect, different pleasures, so far from being competitive, depend each one on the existence of the others to give them magnitude: every pleasure has one dimension which varies directly with the number of instincts, or desires of possible kinds of pleasure — and not simply with the degree of differentiation, but with the ground covered by the differentiated interests, that is, with the range of the objects. In other words, pleasure is a function, among other things, of the idea-horizon; any given pleasure echoes into the whole cavern of a self, and varies in quantity with the volume and resonance of that cavern. Even within the career of a single pleasure it is noticeable that as absorption becomes complete and the circumference of the circle of consciousness begins to contract, the pleasure has passed its culmination, and will tend to zero until the interruption of another object of attention dissipates it.

All this points to the hypothesis that in all pleasure our 'field-ideas' are at work (not as thought of, but as thinking). The 'circumference of consciousness' is a variable which corresponds exactly to those changes in the vividness of the field-ideas which we supposed to represent a certain tension or potential in the centers. And this tension, we said, was in turn a function of the competition of impulses. For example, the extension of time-vista both forward and backward which marked the earliest economic advances of mankind, is concomitant with the growing possibility of inhibiting a present impulse by the idea of a future value. The continuous subjection of impulse to the consent of all the possibilities in a time-field means indeed an interference with pleasure in the sense that each claimant for attention has to struggle for possession; but it means that every object which gains this attention is the source of a pleasure whose value is greater than that of an undisputed enjoyment of the same object in proportion to the enhancement of the time-idea. In physical language, every increase of the potential energy of the centers increases all conscious values in the same proportion.

What the physiological processes are which play themselves off in the actual business of enjoyment, I can here do no more than hint. All pleasure is rhythmic and tends to self-maintenance. A mood,

which is a value-experience on a somewhat roomy and deliberate scale, becomes pleasurable in proportion as it learns the arts of life, as melancholy feeds and reproduces itself from node to node of its rhythm. The quality we call 'pleasure' is deeply connected with this formal character of the processes involved (a character which makes of them precisely what the mathematicians mean by a 'group'). On the conscious side, it will be evident by a little observation, that the change which occurs when a trying experience after repetition becomes pleasurable, may be described as the acquisition of an *idea* under which each element of the experience is subsumable as it arises. When for instance anxiety in a given situation gives way to confidence, we have acquired on the intellectual side, *vista*, and on the practical side a readiness to meet with appropriate action whatever type of event may arise in the course of the experience. So with a mood: it is implicitly a *Weltanschauung*, and it lives by the process of corroborating its theory of things in the events that pass its focus; in this commerce of its idea with the instances of life lies its satisfaction, be it a grouch or a glory. I propose that the same is true of organic pleasures. In them, nature has embodied in structure the *idea* concerned; she has solved the problem of that particular evil for us (for doubtless all the destruction which is at the heart of consciousness is intrinsically painful); and the idea she uses will be most difficult to drag into the foreground of vision. But that the idea is present in physiological concentration, and can in time be read, no one who follows the spiritual progeny of any instinct can question.

My thesis then is simply this: that all pleasure is essentially a process of intercourse between an idea and its instance. The field-ideas of any consciousness will be concerned in all of its pleasures; and each of these pleasures will have as one of its dimensions a quantity which varies with the effective range of its total field.

III. THE THEORY OF CONSCIENCE.

Since Spencer, much has been done by way of distinguishing conscience from those types of inhibition which more or less closely resemble it and ally themselves with it. The work of describing psychologically the unique characters of conscience is in the nature of the case always unfinished; but it will be sufficient for our purposes if, by way of a phenomenology of conscience, we may make clear the separation between conscience itself and the *load* which conscience carries or adopts.

The load is the relatively changeable aspect of conscience. Every

individual in the course of his career makes numerous changes in the points of scruple which constitute the burden or application of his conscience; the race has done the same thing on far greater scale. Perhaps the first burden and certainly the most permanent protégés of conscience are the 'secondary instincts' — but they are not conscience. This load makes use of all accessible means of support: pains, punishments, associations of approval and disapproval, and all the well-known instruments of social propagation, so that in the contents of conscience as we find it in ourselves there are motives traceable not only to our own education and experience but to every stage of our historic and phylogenetic journey, motives in which the aspirations of the Orient, or even the sorrows of those remote pre-moral ancestors whom Spencer invokes, are among the comparatively recent relics. But all this is something other than conscience. No theory indeed is complete which does not explain the circumstance, remarkable enough in itself, that conscience has the capacity of allying itself with all this material — that it is able so early in human history to lend effective support to a struggling secondary instinct, and to turn the natural disadvantage of the remote consideration into some sort of equivalent chance for survival. But the first point is to distinguish the thing itself from all its adoptions; and I shall resume very summarily what seem to me the most significant points in that separation.

1. Conscience has nothing to do primarily with the way we feel about any specifiable *kinds of action*. For it is a more central affair than can be described in terms of a connection between types of action and such elements of experience as might adhere, by association, etc., directly to these types.

Nothing is more astonishing in the earliest history of the moral motive than the speed with which it shakes free from peripheral lines of association and becomes an organic attitude to action in general which it requires some use of subsuming intelligence to apply to particular kinds of action. The function of those *third parties* to the moral situation which appear so early in moral development — the alleged first ancestor, the totem, the lawgiver, etc. — is primarily that of supporting conscience in this central position, the position, that is, of relative independence of the 'types of action' and thereby of more or less freely variable application to them. Psychologically expressed, the thought of an action has to pass through the thought of this third party, with the regime he represents, before that action or kind of action is considered right or wrong.

2. The painful quality which we attribute to the motive side of

conscience is also a part of its load; that is, it is adventitious. Conscience is necessarily painful only in so far as all hesitation, or the halting of immediate satisfaction, is painful. Whatever traces and suggestions of past pains and punishments conscience bears with it must be referred to its accretions, not to its nature. The sort of check which conscience imposes upon action is more nearly like that which some inarticulate presentiment of a greater good might impose upon a definable good. But strictly speaking, conscience has nothing to do with represented pleasures any more than with represented pains, nor with any represented utilities of an inheritable sort, as will appear from the following:

3. Conscience resembles the æsthetic consciousness in being a continuous source of new requirements, not traceable to any 'lessons' of previous experience. If it were the record in us of experiences of any sort already finished and organically digested it would tend to fading rather than to finesse. But nothing more than conscience is subject to explorative origination, and to the sport of virtuosoship.

The theory of the biological aspect of conscience which I have now to propose is simple. It depends upon the theory of ideas and values already developed, and needs but one further preliminary,—the proposition, namely, that any *flux* in consciousness is, or may become, itself an object of or factor in consciousness.

Just as we have impressions not only of distinct static objects, as stones and trees, but also of *processes*, as dawning or waning of light; so we have awareness not alone of high spirits and low spirits, but also of the rise and fall of spirits, if these changes are sufficiently rapid; so also, of the flux of vigor, of the loosening of attention, etc.,—sometimes even of waking or falling asleep. I presume that every flux in consciousness is in some measure an object of consciousness, for consciousness is by definition, 'that region in which appearance and reality coincide'; though it may well be that few fluxes are separately registered and noted.

Now if our theory of values is sound, the most significant of all fluxes in any consciousness for the integrity of its values would be a flux in the effective range of its field-ideas; for we proposed that the field-ideas were factors in every particular experience of value. Physically, every pleasure has for one of its factors a coefficient of potential tension in the centers; and the potential capacity of these centers has been very gradually extended as instincts have balanced each other, the most sensitive index of this growth being the range of effective bearing of our field-ideas upon the immediate business of

living. Any act which rejects the bearing, let us say of the future upon the present, wilfully obscuring the time-vista and tending to diminish its efficiency in consciousness, will strike a blow at the degree of all values in that consciousness. It will do so, moreover, in a way of which the agent can at the time have no inkling.

Conscience, I believe, is the perception of this differential; that is, on the physical side, it is a recognition of the flux, real or virtual, of potential capacity in the nervous centers; on the side of consciousness, it is a sense of flux in the valid bearing, or efficiency, of my field-ideas. Or, since all field-ideas in the same consciousness must come, as we have said, to an understanding with each other, so that they act as parts of a single field which we may symbolize abstractly as 'the whole,' conscience may be described simply as the perception of flux in the awareness of the whole.

In this description the word perception is open to valid objection, inasmuch as the consciousness which is experiencing the flux in question does not interpret its experience in terms of any such flux. The change which affects 'ideas' consciousness always tries to interpret as a change in 'experiences,' referring its uneasiness to the agency of mysterious *objects*, — the 'third parties' above mentioned. It would perhaps be better to say not that the flux is 'perceived,' but that this actual flux has become a separately effective agent in consciousness, leaving undetermined how consciousness, in its more or less bedevilled efforts to construe to itself what is happening, shall report these effects. On the biological side the language seems to me sufficiently precise. I make no attempt to portray to my mind the ultimate physical occurrences — an attempt which would be presumptuous with far more knowledge of these processes than I can boast: I am content to state what I believe to be the true *genus* of the event itself. To say that we are aware of a thing, is to say, biologically, that the representative of the thing is doing some work within. The work which conscience does, we thought to be inhibitive in character. Now wherever there are field-ideas at all, there are fluxes of field-ideas as a matter of course: but *conscience begins when this flux begins to be itself effective*, through whatever apparatus. Biologically, therefore, we may say that the 'recognition' of the flux above described consists in a *resistance* to a negative flux wherein the capacity of the centers is diminished. The biological equivalent of conscience is: A resistance to any tendency to diminish the potential capacity of the nervous centers. If this supposition is valid, it should at least accord with the phenomena of conscience which we have brought forward.

It is evident that conscience would from the start be independent of external experiences associated with any special 'types of action.' Conscience would work just as decisively in inhibiting an action which threatened our field-integrity in an entirely new and unheard-of way, as it would in the case of a thoroughly conventional mode of offense — perhaps better. But any external sign of disapproval upon an action undesirable in this intimate way would add its definite 'no' to the less definite 'no' of conscience; and any considerable group of such tangible corroborations of conscience would form a body of fusions which even to skilled psychological observation, if it were of the prevalent point-blank variety, would defy analysis. Conscience pure and simple is distinguishable only in its work of initiative and variation.

And we can see further how conscience would have an æsthetic and super-useful character. As a sense for a differential, it would vary with powers of discrimination; it would be a function of 'finess of fiber.' It is entirely conceivable that a prodigy of conscience should appear in the midst of a relatively rough-shod community, which could not be the case if conscience were the vanishing echo of an already fixed racial inheritance. But if conscience outstrips utility, it is not hard to see that it would tend to be useful. For the field-ideas are but signs of the adequacy with which consciousness presents to itself its world. Conscience at any time stands for a superabundance of adaptation. But, as in many other cases, nature has had to adapt herself *generously* because there was no way whereby she could adapt just enough and no more.

Finally, we can see that as it would be impossible for early man to discover the nature of the evil that threatened him in his troubles of conscience, so it would be impossible for him to express it accurately in terms of any known good. Its voice in him, until he seized upon the sticks and straws of 'empirical' corroborations, would be chiefly that of inarticulate resistance, a check which gave no clear reason for its presence, a categorical imperative or forbiddal. But in so far as he tried to make plain to himself the uneasiness at his center he would have to connect it with the widest objects of his Weltanschauung — his future, his ancestors, and his spirits. For these remotest objects are only the outpost stakes which we have set as marks of the widest total mental ranges we have thus far conquered. The sense of duty as a strain indicates that the range of 'the whole' is being enlarged. The sense of pleasure which at length displaces duty in that same type of action may mean that this degree of totality is now secure. But unless we suppose that a man's mind can reach a complete adequacy of view,

the sense of duty can never, as Spencer suggests, be expected to disappear.

The final test of any such theory as this will be found in its ability to explain the history of the evolution of conscience. This immense task must be reserved. What I have here aimed to do has been accomplished — to show the natural relations of 'ideas,' values, and duties, through the medium of their common biological context.

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE.

An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience. J. B. BAILLIE, M.A., D.Phil. London and New York, Macmillan, 1906. Pp. xx + 344.

In this work, Professor Baillie follows his notable *Hegel's Logic* with a metaphysics of experience done in the spirit of the Master. As in the earlier work, the *Phenomenology of Mind* is his effective 'open sesame.' The author, like Hegel in his 'voyage of discovery,' sets himself the task of proving the developmental character of experience and the fact that, throughout the development, experience is 'from one end to the other a realization of a spiritual principle' (p. vii). He makes effort, however, to guard against the danger to which Hegel's method is so liable, namely, of so accentuating the inadequacy of experience and the necessity for its sublation by the Real that experience, instead of being explained, is explained away. He emphasizes the fact that in giving an idealistic account of experience 'we should be able to feel that, in the result, we are in touch with actual experience' (p. vii). 'Experience lives and moves through different forms, each with a distinctive nature of its own' (p. viii). And yet he sees, too, that it is the very business of idealistic construction to show that in all our touch with experience 'we are dealing with a single principle controlling all its movements' (p. vii). He concludes, therefore, that "a complete idealistic explanation of experience ought. . . to show (1) that each phase of experience embodies in a specific way the one spiritual principle animating all; (2) that each is distinct from every other simply by the way it embodies that principle; (3) that each is connected with the other and so with the whole in virtue of its realizing that principle with a certain degree of completeness; (4) that the whole of experience is a necessary evolution of the one principle of experience through various forms, logically connected as a series of stages, manifesting a single principle from beginning to end" (p. viii).

The author cannot be too highly praised for the success which has attended his treatment of the first three problems. While he fully acknowledges his debt to the *Phenomenology of Mind*, a debt recog-

nizable on every page and in the spirit of the whole construction, it must be said that he has 'done over' the work of Hegel with such masterly lucidity and power that the meaning of the great idealist should be clear and his purpose vital and convincing even to those who, as Mr. Bradley says, have duly condemned him and are now willing to read him. The great merit of Professor Baillie's book is the 'sense of reality' that it gives. It is idealistic, yea, even to absoluteness; and yet it leaves one with the feeling that it has spirited away nothing in behoof of some *monstrum horrendum* of an Absolute. Experience, with its vividness, its distinctness, its sense of initiative, and freedom, and responsibility, retains its real qualities; the only difference that the theory makes, is that these, instead of constituting a haphazard world of 'the many,' judged at their surface values, are shown to have their place and their organic meanings within the orderly development of spirit, that development, namely, in which spirit comes, with more and more adequacy, to the expression of itself. As with Hegel, the course of the evolution of spirit witnesses not the utter rejection of the inadequate stages, but their transformation, so that in the perfect realization what is real in each stage has its effective function. The development of experience is regarded as a continuous and indeed intrinsic effort to win more and more adequate interpretations of that in experience which is the stimulus to its entire advance. Or, more concretely, the whole effort of experience, the motive power of its every stage, is to achieve unity with itself.

In the first pages of his book, one wonders often what the author means by his constantly reiterated statement that the end is 'unity.' One who comes from the obscurities of the post-Kantian schools and the super-obscurities of their commentators, dislikes to have 'unity' shot at him out of a pistol and quite without the courtesy of a preliminary warning. Take, for example, such a sentence as this (p. 24): "We seem bound to admit that, in the long run, the only objectivity which is final is that in which the unity determining finite processes within experience is simply the *unity of all experience as such.*" Or again, on the following page: "To explain the ground of the objectivity which all forms of finite experience claim to possess, we must start with the idea of an Absolute Single Experience." One gasps at this, after but twenty-four pages of preparation! Yet, if the pluralistic-minded reader is but patient, he will find that, in the end, the unity intended is not the ogre 'One,' that terrifies into silence every peep for independence, but is that unity-in-freedom which is with equal reality an organic multiplicity; in short, the unity of spirit. Indeed, one of

the marked successes of the book is its clarification of the concept of 'unity-with-self,' or 'Absolute Spirit.' This concept has been the *bête noir* of those who have seen in Absolute Idealism nothing but an attempt to surrender all reality to an all-devouring One. And there is no doubt that the "black beast" has been real enough! Professor Baillie, however, shows with convincing power — what seems, whether always revealed or not, to have been the best insight of Hegel — that spiritual unity, although it is one and absolute, is not sheer and sole numerical oneness, but is unity of self with other self, a unity, however, so intimate, that separation of self from self is no longer possible. The unity of Spirit, therefore, is one which in the deepest sense presupposes spiritual plurality. Or, to use a phrase of Dr. McTaggart's, although without implying his further conclusions, it is a unity which may, with equal truth, be described as a 'self-differentiated unity' or a 'self-unified differentiation.'

The admirable, and for the cause of Hegelian idealism, triumphant chapters on 'Moral Experience' and 'Religious Experience' describe the advance of the human spirit toward the realization of its life as Absolute Spirit. In the realization of that life, the individuality so emphasized in Moral Experience is not eviscerated; it is but deepened and widened, made indeed into individuality that, notwithstanding, nay, even by reason of its particularity, is in strictest truth universal. The author shows with clearness the presence of the wider unity even in the emphatic individualism of Morality: "The moral life is said to imply 'Freedom.' To be free is to be 'at home with ourselves along with others,' to realize ends which are ends of our own choosing, and in which, when realized, we shall both find ourselves and have our self acknowledged by others. But that result does not merely *imply* Society, as if our moral life were our own individual affair, and Society were there merely to confirm us in our purpose. *It is literally the activity of a social, of a universal self-consciousness*, at every point. The end is 'ours,' we 'choose' it, *i. e.*, it is the expression of our self, of the self we are conscious of. But this means that it is ours *as distinct from the end of some other self*, whose existence and reality are therefore essential to make it possible for us to *call* it 'ours' in particular. . . . This means that the end is 'accepted' by others (or 'rejected,' as the case may be); *i. e.*, the end is *not merely* 'my' end, but the end for a universal self-consciousness" (p. 278).

Thus, although the Absolute is the end in view, there is no shirking of the problem of individual freedom. The merit of the dialectic is that freedom, which, in its usual utterances, is so brazenly atomistic, is

refuted out of its own lips and shown to depend for the very possibility of its being upon the reality of universal spirit. The author's constant effort is to show the profound error of the view of the world as an aggregate of isolated individuals. So he complains of Kant (p. 282) that for him moral individuals "remained individuals separate, unique, isolated *qua* individuals. . . . They remained unique, impenetrable units of moral activity through, and in a sense, in spite of, their following the same moral law. . . . The position of absolute idealism is sharply contrasted with all this. The universality of moral action is not an attribute of it, but its very essence, because Morality does not have any being at all until the self has achieved conscious universality and actively lives in and for it. The universality is not made by the act being moral. The universality is *there*, and *thence* comes the possibility of Morality. . . . And the universal self-consciousness, while it does not exist apart from self-conscious individuality, is *per se* as real, as actual to start with, and all along, as the latter. There is logically no *separation* possible between the two. A *distinction* there is, as we shall see, but that is not separation. Hence Society is not *derived* from individual activity as directed by universal ends. It is merely maintained by that process, and is as much a 'fact' as the individual's activity." Again, and more explicitly, he says of the relation of individual to universal self-consciousness (p. 286): "Self-consciousness appears as self-sufficient in and through individuality, and does so in virtue of the fact that universality here is not an attribute of separate centers of self-conscious life, but a substantial universal self, constituting the very basis of the completeness and sufficiency any particular individual feels. There are thus two opposed or contrasted factors in this mode of experience. These are the life of universal self-consciousness,—substantial and actual universality; and the life of each moment of it,—the distinct individual centers sharing in and living by that universality. We cannot cut the two asunder."

Thus, when we have followed the author through the book, we find that the unity which he holds to be the stimulus to all advance in experience is not an all-engulfing, numerically identical One, but the unity of spiritual harmony. The importance of his view lies in the fact that for him the unity, even as a harmony, is not derivative of the individuals, a kind of common quality attaching to them all, but is as primary and substantial as they. Thus the author, like Hegel, cannot rightly be called either monist or pluralist. His category of Spirit will not suffer the bonds of these terms. His doctrine is one which, like Hegel's at its best, transcends both monism and pluralism in behoof of the richer reality of Spirit.

The first four chapters of the book are prolegomena to the interpretation of experience. The main object of these chapters is to demonstrate, especially by criticism of Kant, the error of the dualistic view of knowledge and reality, and to show that the true ideal of experience is the complete unity of subject and object, or of subject completely conscious of self. The author then proceeds with his developmental view of experience, showing experience to be of different 'levels,' the higher coming into being out of the lower and less adequate by the inherent dialectic of the latter. The key to the whole movement is briefly stated at the end of Chapter IV. : "The first step is to find out where to begin, and what are the main stages through which the argument must pass. This is easily stated. We have, as we have said, subject and object as the antithetic elements — the concrete reality of conscious experience, and the key to its entire meaning lies in the complete explicit unity of the two, the subject as conscious of itself in the object. Now the individual subject may be aware of an object as purely and simply other than, *opposed to*, itself, have not even a feeling of implicit unity with it. It may, again, be aware of *self* as *other than* but implicitly one with the subject-mind conscious of it. And finally, it may have overcome all sense of otherness in its object and be fully and explicitly aware of itself in the object of which it is conscious. More simply, perhaps, we may say that in the first stage the individual is conscious of objects which are *prima facie* quite alien to and outside the subject; in the second, of the self, but as something which is ostensibly different from, and over against the subject conscious of it; in the third, of the self as transparently identical with the subject." These main stages are further divided into Sense-Experience; Perceptual Experience; Understanding and the World of Noumena and Phenomena; Self-Conscious Experience; the Sphere of Reason or Scientific Experience; the Sphere of Finite Spirit or Moral Experience; the Sphere of Absolute Spirit or Religious Experience or Contemplation. As the author regards these several 'levels' of experience, he notes a development from the lowest stage, at which the world is perceived as 'things' and 'qualities,' to that at which it is thought as 'forces' and their 'manifestations.' Here distinction is made between noumena and phenomena, and 'explanation' is a conscious aim. Out of this 'level,' develops consciousness of self, first in the form of 'desire,' in which the object is selfless, and the self desiring is only a particular self; then in the form of 'recognition,' in which the object is itself a self and for a self. It is in this section that the author begins to show his meaning of spiritual unity as a unity of self

with self. Out of self-consciousness develops 'reason,' with its stages of observation, in terms of categories; and of judging and systematic connection. The result of reason is to establish a self-determined universal experience (systematic connection). It implies a universal self-consciousness. Its further development, therefore, is in the form of the Moral Order of Society, where the individual acts in and through universal spirit. But in moral life, while spirit is established as supreme reality, it is realized only by effort and process. The end still to be reached is that Spirit shall be "fully actual to itself as a whole and as a unity containing all distinctions at once. To be conscious of it in this way is to take up the point of view of Absolute Spirit."

To one versed in Hegel, the development is, in its main outlines, an 'old story'; but Professor Baillie's treatment is so fresh and his independence of Hegel in the details of the dialectic often so clarifying that the Hegelian finds joy in the reading. To one much wedded to the 'trialectic' philosophies of the present, the comprehensiveness of the interpretation, its evident intention to grasp the meaning of experience from beginning to end, must either seem unblushing effrontery or splendid courage.

One point, however, must be made in criticism of Professor Baillie's treatment. At the beginning of this review, we stated the four problems which he set for himself, and we remarked that he had worked out with consummate skill the first three of them. His fourth problem was to show "that the whole of experience is a necessary evolution of the one principle of experience through various forms, logically connected as a series of stages manifesting a single principle from beginning to end." Professor Baillie seems to confine himself to but one meaning of 'necessary evolution,' ignoring altogether another meaning for which the reader rightly demands some consideration. Professor Baillie feels that he has shown the 'necessary evolution' of the stages of experience if he has found the lower stage dialectically demanding the next higher, and so on. But the further question remains, Why are any of these stages necessary? Why should we suppose that the process of Absolute Spirit 'requires' a level of perception, that must be transformed into, sublated by, a level of understanding? Why the need of the imperfect levels? It hardly solves the problem to say that all the possible relations between subject and object must be realized, for this simply begs the question by assuming that just these possibilities must be.

Here is just the 'blind spot' in all absolute idealisms up to date,

seeming to indicate that they have not considered with sufficient thoroughness the relation between the individual in his particularity and the individual in his encompassing universality. Professor Baillie wears his 'blind spot' with due physiological propriety, for he seems not even aware that it is there. His principle of Absolute Spirit, as the stimulus to the evolution of experience, is wonderfully effective *once experience of various 'levels' is granted*. But there is just the rub! In short, Professor Baillie has given us a *metaphysical psychology*, if the phrase will be allowed, not an *ontology*: he has described and shown the goal of the *development within experience*; he has not *accounted* either for the *development* or the *experience*.

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LECTURES ON HUMANISM.

Lectures on Humanism with Special Reference to its Bearings on Sociology. J. S. MACKENZIE. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp. iv + 243.

These lectures were delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, on the Dunkin Lectureship in Sociology. As the author states in his preface, "the courses on this foundation are short, and open to the public, and so do not furnish an opportunity for the discussion of the fundamental principles of the science of Sociology." Dr. Mackenzie, has, therefore, devoted the first eight chapters of his book to an elementary, popular consideration of a number of the familiar social problems. The titles of these chapters for the most part suggest their contents: The Meaning of Humanism; The Growth of Humanism; Humanism in Philosophy; Humanism in Politics; Humanism in Economics; Humanism in Education; Humanism in Religion; Limitations of Humanism; Implications of Humanism.

The ninth and last chapter, which was evidently not delivered as a lecture, the author has added in order to furnish a fuller statement of the philosophical implications of the point of view that is central in the book. This is obviously the chapter in which students of philosophy will be most interested. The reader is made to look forward with keen expectation to this final chapter by the frequent foot-notes throughout the lectures, which are continually promising further and more adequate treatment of difficult problems in that last chapter.

One finds a disappointment on the first page of the opening chapter, on the Meaning of Humanism. Most readers will be attracted to the

volume because of its title, and will naturally expect to find here a discussion of those recent philosophical theories that have been advanced under the name of humanism. The author says, however, "I ought perhaps to explain at once that I do not use the term in quite that sense that has recently been given to it by a certain school of your younger writers. I do not use it as equivalent to what is commonly — and I think correctly — described as 'pragmatism,' or 'voluntarism.' . . . What I understand by humanism may be most simply described as a point of view from which human life is regarded as an independent center of interest, if not even as containing within itself the key to all other interests, or as being, in old Greek phraseology, the 'helm' by which the universe is steered. In this sense I contrast it with the more familiar term 'naturalism' — the attempt to understand human life in the light of the forces that operate in the world around it — and also with supernaturalism, that which seeks for the explanation of the world in powers that are in their nature distinct both from man and from the world in which he lives."

Dr. Mackenzie has discovered several different interpretations of the term humanism. Of these, three distinguishable current meanings seem to him important to recognize. I give his account of these meanings in brief: The first sense is that in which it simply means that special emphasis is to be laid on the study of human life. It is in this sense that Socrates may be taken as the typical humanist. But it is not possible to rest here. No one who studies the world scientifically can divorce man's life from other things, and treat it in a way that is exclusively its own. Man is, in some sense, a part of a larger whole, and can only be properly understood in relation to that whole. Hence we are led on from this first interpretation of humanism to a theory that maintains that the world as a whole is to be interpreted from the human standpoint. But this again may either mean that the world is to be somehow explained away, as being an illusion, an appearance, or something of which nothing can be known; or it may mean rather that the world is to be regarded as having a kind of reality, but that in the last analysis it must be interpreted in relation to human life.

I think everyone will heartily agree with Dr. Mackenzie that the last of these interpretations is the only one that can ultimately be accepted as philosophically satisfactory, and we should gladly concede that in this sense the term almost loses its specific meaning, and must be no longer opposed to naturalism. Humanism in this larger view, 'seeks to include the facts of the natural world, and to give them a

place as aspects of reality, though subordinating them to conceptions derived from the study of human life.'

In the chapter on the Growth of Humanism, the author has reviewed the familiar landmarks in the history of philosophy. As a point of view contrasted with Naturalism, the author rightly tells us that Humanism is found far back in the history of philosophy. He sees 'the finest and most characteristic expression of the humanistic position' in ancient Greece. "Humanism is the attitude of mind which seeks the key to the world in the life of man, or, at any rate, the key to man's life within himself."

In the chapter on Humanism in Philosophy the author contends that that which chiefly gives significance to the contrast between Humanism and Naturalism — that is, between the vitalistic and the mechanical view of the world 'is the presence of elements that require a teleological explanation in the former, and the absence of such elements in the latter.' There is, of course, nothing new or striking in this view. The author has aimed simply to state in a modern popular form the old distinction between efficient and final causes. The teleological humanistic world is a world of qualitative judgments; it is a world of values. The mechanical naturalistic world is a world of quantitative judgments of fact. Dr. Mackenzie agrees with Ward, Royce, Bradley, and others, that the category of quantity is not the sole sovereign principle of our human nature.

Dr. Mackenzie uses the term humanism throughout, as the antithesis of naturalism, as expressing the point of view that tries to interpret man in his own light, and the universe in the light of man; whereas naturalism seeks rather to interpret the material universe in its own light, and man in the light of the material universe. And yet, he recognizes that, while these two positions may be regarded as opposed, there is a third, viz., the position of supernaturalism, which seeks the explanation of the universe, or of its most important aspects, in something that transcends both nature and human life.

In the last chapter, the author has given a clear and concise account of his general philosophic position, which may be briefly summarized. He believes that there are only four possible explanations of life. It must be explained (1) from within, or (2) from something still higher than itself, or (3) from something entirely beyond the reach of our experience, or (4) that it must be incapable of any explanation at all. These alternatives give rise to (1) humanism, (2) some kind of supernatural revelation, (3) agnosticism, and (4) pure scepticism. The last is the refuge of despair. The second and third, are hardly distin-

guishable from it, except in so far as they yield some positive principle for the explanation of our life in this universe. But a principle capable of throwing light upon our experience obviously cannot be altogether beyond the reach of our experience. In fact, we find that both agnostics and the adherents of the various forms of revealed religion are continually stating their ultimate explanations, in modes that are essentially humanistic. "On the whole, therefore, we seem to be led to the conclusion that some form of humanism is the only possible method of making our universe intelligible to ourselves."

It is evident that by humanism Dr. Mackenzie after all means hardly more than what is ordinarily connoted by the term Idealism. As a popular contribution to the philosophy of concrete Idealism, these lectures doubtless served their purpose well and in their printed form they will continue to help counteract the current 'veiled materialism.' There is, throughout, a wholesome insistence upon the doctrine that we cannot finally cut off our human life from the rest of the universe and treat it as something to be understood entirely in its own light.

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PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems. MARY WHITON CALKINS, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College. New York, Macmillan Company, 1907. Pp. xxii + 575.

In the title of this work, in the preface, in the introductory chapter, and occasionally elsewhere, there is a lack of precision in the use of the terms 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics.' Among the most fundamental and persistent of philosophical problems are those relating to knowledge and to values, the epistemological and the 'ethico-æsthetico-religious' problems. It is quite clear, however, that it is not Professor Calkins's aim to deal with these problems. She does not aim to give us a general introduction to philosophy, either in the form of a discussion of its persistent problems or in the form of a history of modern philosophy; but to give us an introduction to *metaphysics*.

The main problem of metaphysics is declared to be the nature of the 'all-of-reality.' Concerning this 'irreducible all-of-reality,' two questions suggest themselves: one as to its qualitative character, of *what sort* is it, idealistic or non-idealistic; the other as to its quantitative character, is it one or many, monistic or pluralistic. But as metaphysical idealism may, in turn, be either phenomenistic or per-

sonalistic (spiritualistic), the main problem of metaphysics divides into three: the problem as to whether reality is numerically one or many, the problem as to whether it is qualitatively idealistic or non-idealistic, and the problem as to the interpretation of idealism in terms of selfhood. It is with these metaphysical issues that this book concerns itself, both in its historical and in its more constructive portions. All modern systems are, the author holds (pp. 9-10), naturally grouped in harmony with these distinctions, and the possible types of doctrine are exhausted in the systems from Descartes to Hegel inclusive.

The body of the work consists of four parts. We have first expositions and criticisms of the 'systems of numerical pluralism': the pluralistic dualism of Descartes (ch. 2), the pluralistic materialism of Hobbes (ch. 3), the pluralistic spiritualism of Leibniz (ch. 4) and of Berkeley (ch. 5), the pluralistic phenomenistic idealism of Hume (ch. 6). We next have a 'criticism of preceding systems': the critical philosophy of Kant (ch. 7). Then follow expositions and criticisms of the 'systems of numerical monism': the monistic pluralism of Spinoza (ch. 8), the advance toward monistic spiritualism (personalism) of Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer (ch. 9), and the culminating monistic spiritualism of Hegel (ch. 10). The 'conclusion' (ch. 11), on contemporary systems, devotes some fifty pages to an independent discussion of 'the issue between pluralistic and monistic personalism.'

Following the body of the work is an elaborate and very useful appendix (pp. 457-564), consisting of bibliographies of modern writers on philosophy and of discussions, chiefly relating to portions of Spinoza's *Ethics* and Kant's *Critique* not considered in the body of the work, but including an interesting note on the order of the Hegelian categories.

As regards the style of the work, one may not like the author's frequent use of nouns as adjectives ('nature forces,' 'extension modes,' etc.), nor her fondness for hyphenated adjectives ('more-than-temporal,' etc.) and hyphenated nouns ('idea-plus-the-bodily-change,' 'that-which-is-thought-of-as-existing,' etc.). Still the style of the book, on the whole, is clear, straightforward, forcible and dignified. The book is extremely readable; there is not a dull page in it.

From her fondness for the balancing or weighing of arguments and for judging systems by the cogency of their argumentation, Professor Calkins at times gives the reader the impression that she conceives the business of metaphysics, after the fashion of the seventeenth century thinkers, to be the formulation of chains of arguments or demonstra-

tion of theses, instead of (as it is) the interpretation of experience, the solving of problems.

Professor Calkins lays stress upon the exhaustive character of her classification of metaphysical systems, and insists, as already stated, that all possible distinctive forms of doctrine are exhibited in the historical systems from Descartes to Hegel inclusive. While her scheme of division is undoubtedly suggestive, many will question the exclusive claims which she puts forth on behalf of it. Locke is excluded from treatment on the ground of the substantial identity of his system with that of Descartes, while the systems of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, 'as internally inconsistent, fail,' we are told, 'to represent any one type of philosophy' (p. 10).

The expositions and criticisms of the various systems are admirably clear, forcible and suggestive. These expositions and criticisms give evidence of the author's thorough familiarity, at first hand, with these systems. Copious references and citations greatly enhance the expositions and criticisms, and encourage the reader to turn to the original sources themselves. In a history of philosophy or of metaphysics one may naturally look for rounded and relatively colorless reproductions of past systems. Professor Calkins, however, exhibits marked independence and originality in her handling of the various systems. She often frankly and openly deviates in her expositions of a system from its author's own order of thought, passing over briefly positions which the author of the system made prominent, and emphasizing others left by him relatively unemphasized. This originality and independence of treatment and the fact that each system is studied primarily in reference to its teaching on the metaphysical issues named above, make the chapters all the more readable and suggestive; while they make it impossible to regard the expositions as colorlessly faithful historical reproductions.

In view of the author's acknowledged free handling of the systems she discusses and her specific aims, it would, perhaps, be unfair to criticize her expositions in detail. Her interpretations, however, of the systems of Spinoza, Hume, Schopenhauer and Kant, in some of their fundamental aspects, will certainly not pass wholly unchallenged. Spinoza is interpreted as teaching that God is self-conscious (pp. 297, 305); and as conceiving the attributes (294) in a way which undermines the fundamental unity of substance. A positive metaphysic is found in Hume which gives him almost the character of a great constructive thinker. Schopenhauer is interpreted as holding to a self-conscious and personal Absolute (343, 359); and his pessimism is

dismissed as a mere corollary or off-shoot of his metaphysics (352, 357). While of Kant it is declared that his system includes 'no teaching new to philosophy' (197), and that 'there is little which he taught that cannot be discovered better stated in the doctrines of predecessors or of successors' (198, cf. 272-273). The exalted estimate of the achievements and merits of Hegel may be accepted by Professor Calkins's fellow Neo-Hegelians, but will hardly be by others.

As to the positive teaching of the book, its great merit is the prominence given the doctrine of self-hood. The author's able defence, in her psychological writings, of a 'psychology of selves,' is here admirably supplemented. Throughout the book stress is laid on the fact that 'the immediateness of self-consciousness is the starting-point of all philosophy, the guarantee of all truth' (409). The question fundamental to all philosophy is declared to be, is there a self which underlies evanescent psychic phenomena, a unique and identical real agent which underlies and unifies distinct perceptions (cf. 189, 190, 186)? One of the most significant tendencies in contemporary philosophy, we are told, is the emphasis upon the truth of personality (109); while 'the most hotly contested of the modern philosophical issues' 'concerns the ultimate distinctness of selves' (411). The great problem is 'the problem of the nature, the number, and the relations of conscious selves' (407).

The discussion of this issue as between numerically pluralistic and monistic personalism in the concluding chapter (ch. 11) is one of the crowning excellencies of the book. Nowhere else, perhaps, can the reader find this great issue so simply and clearly presented. The utmost frankness and directness is shown; with no attempt to cloud over the issue by hazy phrases. The author's very frankness of statement in presenting her own Neo-Hegelian position, which is essentially that of Professor Royce (cf., however, on this point, the note on p. 435), and in arguing for it, is deserving of all praise. Such frankness of statement reveals, however, as nothing else could, the inherent difficulties, not to say contradictions, of the position itself. For example, to admit that 'in so far as I am self of the moment, *I now*,' a '*now-self*,' a '*self-now*,' I am a self which is 'not identical with the absolute,' 'I am different from the absolute self,' so different indeed that I 'may really be free,' 'may or may not conform to absolute will,' 'am free to be good or bad' (451-452), is to admit what can never be satisfactorily explained, or explained away, by the mere addition of more time or even of eternity. Again, to assert an analogy between the Infinite Self as the includer of all finite selves and the finite self as

'the includer of perceiving, thinking, and feeling experiences' (419), is to overlook the most essential characteristics of selfhood; for a self is aware of its unique oneness, is self-conscious agent, is conscious of freedom, has duties, and possesses rights. While to say that I am 'really free, but free only from the partial, momentary point of view' (452); and to talk of 'choice in opposition to the absolute will' which 'is, ultimately, a subordinated element in the absolute will' (451), is to assert in one breath what is denied in the next.

In conclusion, one can safely say that Professor Calkins's book will interest and benefit the general reader as well as the professional student of metaphysics. By centering attention upon a few fundamental problems and studying these as handled by the great systematic thinkers and on their own merits, ignoring side issues, she has accomplished more than she could have done had she attempted to deal with the whole round of philosophical, or even of metaphysical, problems, and has given us an admirable introduction to contemporary discussions in metaphysics.

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PRAGMATISM.

Pragmatism. A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking.

WILLIAM JAMES. Longmans, Green, 1907. Pp. xiii + 309.

If Professor James had written his book on pragmatism in the form of a technical treatise addressed to students of metaphysics and epistemology, I should not have ventured to review it. But he has tried the very unusual experiment of expounding his philosophical positions to a lay audience and it seems quite proper that there should appear among his reviewers some who read the book with interests other than those of the special student of metaphysical systems.

Furthermore, it must have impressed itself on every reader of current philosophy that the pragmatists have broken away from the ontological attitude and have taken up the problems of truth and knowledge from a distinctly psychological point of departure. The student of psychology has, therefore, a lively interest and sympathy for such a body of doctrine as that which James advances, and he will hardly be charged with transgressing the proprieties if he records a psychologist's reaction upon James's pragmatism.

The first chapter of James's book might be entitled the psychologist's view of the philosopher. Here Professor James tells us that 'temperaments . . . determine men in their philosophies, and always

will' (p. 35). One's own temperament is often unnoticed and yet it is 'the potentest of all our premises' (p. 8). This general statement is made vivid by contrasting the rationalist and the empiricist who face the world with such totally different subjective preparations for knowledge that it is quite impossible to think of them as seeing the world alike. The rationalist looks for system and unity, he is characterized by idealistic, optimistic, and religious tendencies. The empiricist, on the other hand, is not so much interested in broad sweeping generalizations as in individual observations and narrow groups of phenomena. The empiricist is more likely to feel the keen edge of particular cases of suffering and to be pessimistic and even irreligious.

There is another contrast in philosophers that one may add to this which James points out. Some thinkers have such vivid images of external realities that they cannot tolerate any scheme of thought which does not treat these external entities as primary. With such ontologically minded persons experience is always a secondary affair, valuable only because of what it reflects or implies. On the other hand there are the thinkers like James who are more interested in the processes of conscious experience. The mechanism of consciousness is vivid with them. Ideas lead to intense determinations or are modified and even suppressed in the clash of conflicting experiences. The world is a world of aspirations, and of efforts to untangle the snarl of experience. Every item of mental life is a matter of first class importance. Ontology to such a mind is remote, or recognized as altogether unattainable; to speak of it with assurance seems ridiculous. Truth and reality are within one's experience, not somewhere in the empyrean.

Once we recognize this distinction between philosophical temperaments, the fundamental difference between James and the absolutists is easier to understand. James is constantly asking himself what is the character of this or that idea within experience. If a given idea does not modify the stream of mental life, it has for James no significance or value. If on the other hand, an idea so rearranges experience that the stream of thought and desire takes a new course, then that idea is a potent reality. Truths clash with each other, and out of the conflict come forth new truths. Reality is constantly renewed in experience. To the thinker who starts with ontological standards all such statements are inverted. For the typical ontologist the struggle among ideas is real enough but it is secondary; the ontological standards are unmoved by the struggle. When James says that matter and God are equally valid concepts with which to explain the past, and that the concept of God as the cause of happenings in the world is only more valid

because the concept God promises more for experience than could the concept matter, the absolutist with his eye on ontological matter and an ontological God, shudders at the sacrilege and shallowness of the pragmatist.

To be sure the absolutist must admit that his idea of God is indeed subject to development and correction. He must admit that the history of the race and of philosophical systems shows that no man has ever been in contact with the absolute and that many have professed to be whom later generations of absolutists have repudiated; but in spite of all these reasons in favor of a lenient attitude toward a doctrine which regards truth as a progressive development of experience, the absolutist will have his ontology rather than the pragmatist's primary experience.

To the psychologist who stands outside the currents of philosophical discussion, the disputes about the nature of truth which are now being carried on by the pragmatists and rationalists are due to those 'potentest of our premises,' the temperamental variations in ability to envisage external realities.

With this insight into Professor James's purpose we are fully prepared to receive the definition which he gives of pragmatism. It is an attitude, or a method, or a mode of defining truth. In his successive chapters, Professor James makes this clear by coming back to the nature of truth as his central problem. Some of his definitions of truth may be quoted. Thus in his second chapter he writes: "*ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience*" (p. 58, author's italics). In his sixth chapter, which is given up to the problem of truth, various other definitions of truth are given. "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verification*. Its validity is the process of its *valid-ation*" (p. 201, author's italics). Or again, "'the true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving" (p. 222, author's italics).

Such accounts of truth must certainly face the criticism that they tend to degenerate into pure subjectivism. Professor James attempts to avoid subjectivism by recognizing a certain amount of truth which is 'funded.' There are certain beliefs which are behind all our ordinary experiences and as 'common sense' these established categories challenge every new experience and determine the acceptability of the new idea into the total system. To be sure the stock of common

sense ideas is constantly undergoing revision in view of new experiences and the 'common sense' of the next generation will not be the same as ours, for our successors will have the advantage of our revisions. Even the 'funded' truth is accordingly a product of development within experience.

There can be no doubt that here Professor James is 'face to face' with one of his most serious problems. If common sense has a kind of independent reality, his truths may be rescued from that subjection to temporary and trivial expediencies which many have charged against them. If a new idea is verifiable only in view of established canons of common sense then indeed experience has a background which gives the momentary verification more than passing value.

Professor James's account of the origin of common sense categories is the same as that adopted by Schiller. The original concepts of common sense were discovered, he says, by prehistoric geniuses. The common man evidently does not have the mental machinery to coin these fundamental forms of thought. We are all dependent, therefore, for the organization of experience upon the standards set by our more illustrious forefathers. The individualism which everywhere else characterizes James's treatment of experience is here curiously subordinated to external influence. Why James does not recognize what Hobhouse has called 'practical judgment,' and treat the concepts of common sense as products of universal individual efforts to react successfully in ordinary life, is difficult to understand. Genetic psychology is so familiar with forms of development which require a universal agreement in matters of reaction and perception that James seems to have lost a good opportunity here of reinforcing his pragmatic doctrine of truth by a strictly evolutionary account of the foundations of common sense in practical activity. To import so foreign an element into individual thought as the invention of some superior genius is a procedure which should at least be defended in detail if it is to escape the criticism of being a short cut across a very difficult part of the journey.

There is more in the book than the discussion of temperaments and the nature of truth. James is after all some sort of a realist. In his preface he states explicitly that "there is no logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.' The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist" (p. ix). Later (p. 54) he quotes with approval Papini's remark that the pragmatic method may in the hands of various thinkers lead to totally different consequences. One may be led by his application of the prag-

matic method to agnosticism, another may be led to idealistic metaphysics. When, therefore, we find James leading us by the application of the method to an optimistic view of the world, when we find many phrases which show his realistic conclusions, we have to recall his own warning and recognize that these consequences of pragmatic philosophy are not necessary, but are peculiar to his special type of thinking.

Such a distinction between James's pragmatism and his other philosophy is not easy to draw. It is very doubtful indeed whether the majority of James's readers will distinguish between the pragmatic method and the pragmatist's conclusions. Indeed, most readers will be satisfied to accept the exposition of method as true because it leads in the hands of the master to conclusions which satisfy the general desire for optimistic and clearly ontological results. James is no sceptic in his results. The fullness of the world of substance and design, and the most hopeful belief in the absolute are brought back in the end. The most ontologically minded reader is likely to get all the reality he can carry away. The professional ontologist is therefore likely to cry out against all this show of pragmatism and experience which in the end turns out so fully equipped with reals. The answer to exultant ontologists is, it seems to me, repeatedly suggested in the book, though I have not found in their criticisms of pragmatism any very clear evidences of their apprehension of the answer. James says, with all clearness, that the realities to which we are led by experience are all subject to revision, they are not the standards. What ontologist could say with James, reject if you must *my* reals, *my* truths, but build up your own by testing your conclusions, as I have mine, by their 'cash value' in life? An ontology which is pragmatically reached and held as a tentative conclusion is different from an ontology which goes before experience and adopts as its fundamentals noumena before phenomena.

Why pragmatism gets a hearing is clear enough to see when one heeds this warning of James not to confuse his realistic conclusions with his method. The method of revision and re-revision is the method of all science. The idea of an evolving truth is congruous to the whole modern attitude as determined by the doctrine of evolution. All science is willing to postpone indefinitely its ontology and to define its truth as a system of working hypotheses. If it is objected in some quarters that philosophy ought to go further than science and get nearer to ultimate reality, the scientist is likely to turn a deaf ear to such objections and to adhere to the philosopher who tells him as does Pro-

fessor James, that the method of science and the method of philosophy are the same. That Professor James goes further and applies his methods and reaches certain conclusions of an ontological character is not likely to disturb the scientist so much as it does the dissenting metaphysician, for the scientist is sure to take at its face value Professor James's assurance that everyone is to apply the method for himself and to accept those truths which he can verify and absorb in the course of his own experience.

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THE ROOTS OF REALITY.

The Roots of Reality. ERNEST BELFORT BAX. London, E. Grant Richards, 1907. Pp. xii + 331.

The central purpose of this book is to establish the alogical as an ultimate element of reality. The author's general position is avowedly idealistic. He regards as impregnable truth the thesis 'that reality is synonymous with conscious experience possible or actual.' But in opposition to Panlogism, which is condemned because it would reduce the world to a system of pure-thought-forms, he finds it necessary to distinguish within consciousness-in-general antithetic logical and alogical elements. By 'logical' he designates the categorizing thought-form; by 'alogical' the datum or matter which is categorized. These elements are said to have a difference not merely of degree but of kind.

The essay bearing traces of the strong influence upon the author of the systems of Fichte and Schopenhauer has also a close relationship with certain contemporary philosophic movements. It exhibits an attitude of thought which has points of similarity with the Pragmatists who, while emphasizing the active character of mind, have recourse to a ὅλη δακτύλη τοῦ εἶδους — to an as yet uncategorized feltness — as the material of the constructions of concrete experience. It has points of similarity, likewise, with Realists who lay stress upon the datum aspect of experience as a factor never absorbed by thought relations. The author differs, however, from both Pragmatist and Realist, in that, while he emphasizes the datum-aspect of experience and declares that the grounds of reality comprise the potential as well as the actual, his general standpoint is avowedly idealistic. All reality, he holds, must ultimately reduce to consciousness actual or potential.

The author in developing his theory of reality takes as starting-point the generalization which he regards as ultimate, namely, consciousness as such. For all objects of knowledge and all judgments

about them are determinations of consciousness, either possible or actual. Turning to ordinary consciousness he analyzes every concrete experience or reality into two antithetic elements, viz., 'feeling or sensation' and 'form or category.' The feeling element is characterized as primary and immediate; the determinate thought as secondary and mediate. The primary feltness is altogether 'alogical'; the determinate thought arises through mediation of the alogical factor by the 'logical' form or relation. Every concrete experience or reality is a synthesis of these antithetic elements. The alogical datum cannot be reduced to the logical category or *mere* relation. For every relation presupposes terms which are related. These terms are simply *given*. Mere thought can never give them; nor can it adequately express or represent them. By its very nature the alogical is capable only of being immediately felt or simply indicated. Conceptual thought can neither present nor portray it.

The object of thought, then, is a synthesis of logical and alogical elements; it is immediate feltness categorized under an intelligible form. This process of relating thought is found to involve and to imply an apperceiving subject or ego. Within this subject are also found the antithetic logical and alogical elements. The empirical ego implies a pure ego—for the subject has a *thisness* which thought-forms can never absorb. This immediate aspect of the conscious subject points to a 'subject-in-general' which is its ground—which in last analysis is the '*materia prima* of consciousness.' Since the world is a system of differentiations of the subject-in-general the subject and object of a determinate experience cannot be utterly disparate. In some sort the alogical datum no less than the logical form must have its ground in that subject which is the potentiality of all consciousness. Thus the ultimate ground of all experience is found in the subject *per se* "out of which all consciousness wells up—including that objectivity which is no more than otherness of the subject itself."

The distinction between the alogical and the logical naturally dominates the author's discussion of special concepts and problems of philosophy. Reality—the concrete synthesis of alogical and logical elements—is constituted by the manifestation or appearance of Being. Being is not identical with Reality, but is attributed to whatever has potentiality of consciousness. The conscious individual is regarded as a manifestation or fixation of consciousness in general. Although the subject-in-general appears thus under the form of individuation its own personality is doubtful. Philosophical analysis yields no answer to the question whether the ultimate subject is realized only in minds

such as the human, or is realized as concrete self-consciousness apart from such persons. Here, the author concludes, the philosophical attitude must be agnostic. The distinction between *reality* and *truth* also leads to the conclusion that philosophic knowledge can never exhaustively apprehend reality. For reality is a synthetic union of logical and alogical elements and truth deals with the logical. While reality is concrete, truth is abstract. Truth then can merely symbolize the alogical factor in reality.

Ethics and æsthetics, like metaphysics, are said to rest ultimately upon an alogical apprehension whose immediately given content cannot be formulated in thought. In conduct the end is determined by feeling which, as contrasted with reason, is alogical. Rationality defined as 'the mere knowledge of the relation between means and end' is held to be determined by the *felt* desire. Reason thus is always a means never the end itself. Since, in motive, feeling is always the ultimate fact the ought is alogical. Likewise the evaluation of beauty and ugliness is arbitrary, since its basis is alogical feeling which cannot be reduced to reason. However, in both ethics and æsthetics, given the alogical ground there can be constructed a logical system of formulæ constituting a canon.

To the question, "What is the ultimate purposive goal?" the author's answer is that it cannot be an Absolute conceived as pure actuality. Such an Absolute would constitute a '*stasis*' excluding all 'becoming.' In view of the waning emphasis upon the individual and the waxing significance of the social, the author inclines to favor as *telos* a kind of social *megazoön*. To this evolved social '*persona*' individuals would sustain a relation similar to that of cells to a physical organism. But if one reject this *telos*, the ideal as a perfect Absolute is precluded by the fundamental antithesis of good and evil. Though particular evils pass 'the *potentiality* of evil' abides. Nor can one formulate in thought the *telos* of the conscious process. There is however discoverable "a gradual harmonization of the system within systems of which the world of consciousness consists."

The value of this essay as a contribution to philosophy lies in its lucid and in general consistent presentation of the claim to a place in the scheme of reality of a factor which never reduces to *mere* relation. The individual objects of experience involve a fusion of universal and particular. The emphasis laid by Mr. Bax upon the inevitable particular has worth in view of the strong tendency of idealists to resolve reality into its purely formal aspects. In seeking a check for an highly abstract Panlogism, however, the author seems at times to approach

realism more closely than is consistent with his idealistic basis. In the endeavor to make clear-cut the antithesis between datum and conscious-relation he appears to hold form and matter too widely apart. With an alogical ego and an alogical sense-datum in irreducible antithesis to a logical relation, one marvels that the relation ever succeeds in making connections — and indeed that the relation ever arises. Nor, in view of the emphasis laid upon this fundamental antithesis is the puzzle as to *how* this realistic chasm is bridged solved by the assertion that the common ground of the antithetic alogical and logical 'creates in its self-differentiation as subject-object that element of relativity necessary to all experience.' This assertion is inadequate as an explanation of the ground of the logical factor — the thought relation. In the attempt to correct those systems which, because of an exaggerated emphasis upon the formal aspect of reality, remove all ground of the datum-aspect, the author simply reverses the mistake. In his emphasis of the alogical he removes the ground of the logical. It is simply said to arise in self-differentiation of the ultimate subject. And yet this self differentiation is regarded as merely a blind or alogical impulse.

In this problem of self-differentiation of the ultimate subject centers another defect of the author's argument. The 'dynamical process of reality' of which he speaks is defined as blind impulse. But because it grounds the logical there is a constant tendency to apply to this process terms which are properly applied only within the personal sphere. He defines the Absolute as 'principle merely, timeless principle of eternal change in time.' But it is also called 'a *self-realizing* unity of simple tendency and direction.' Here personal attributes seem to be predicated. Predicates of personality are further implied in the assertion that in this 'potentiality of self-realization eternally inherent in the world process' is to be found 'the higher meaning of reality.' This evaluation of the world process seems to lack adequate ground. One would like to know how the universal impulse whose source is beyond the realm of personality and of morality acquires this *higher* significance in the individual consciousness. Such evaluation implies an objective standard of progress and perfection. This surely is not supplied by the author's *telos*, for his social organism is as pure an abstraction as Panlogism has ever been guilty of. Nor is it supplied by a mere *blind*-impulse. And yet because the perfection sought by individual persons is defined as 'asymptotic' the authority of the *telos* would seem to have its source beyond the finite realm. Thus the author's evaluation of the world process appears to

lack adequate basis unless he admit that the ultimate subject is consciously self-directing rather than blind.

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REALITY AND TRUTH.

Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas. JOHN DEWEY.
Mind, 1907, XVI., 317-342.

Mr. Bradley's argument from the formal requirement of consistency of thought to the actual self-consistency of reality, like every form of the ontological argument, rests upon the question-begging intellectualist assumption that thought has a function independent of other functions of life. The contradiction involved — that when thus isolated thought, even according to Mr. Bradley's contention, is internally discrepant and therefore, one would suppose, does not conform to its own standard of consistency, to say nothing of endowing reality with such consistency — would disappear if consistency, as the end and test of thinking, were assumed to mean the harmony attained when an idea of harmonious order is used as formative plan of action by which real oppositions and incompatibilities, otherwise stubbornly persistent, are brought into peaceful and satisfactory coöperation. This would mean that thinking assumes the consistency of reality, not as a fact about reality in general, but as an ideal, attainable through thought-directed activity, for the specific realities that are given as discrepant. The facts of experience make for this view of the practical nature of consistency. The 'collisions' recognized by Mr. Bradley are such to the intellect only because they lead to defeat of purpose; in them reality is not irrational, but it is as yet non-rational. The reflective or logical is a statement of this conflict. The judgment gets material for its subject from the discovery of the nature of the conflict, and for its predicate from the conception of the nature of the object in which the conflict would be terminated. The subject, which is existential because reminiscent or recording, and the predicate, which is meaning or ideal because anticipatory, are thus necessarily correlative, but only within the field of the practical problem with reference to which they arose. Capacity of guiding to the termination of this specific conflict is the measure or criterion of truth. The term truth is sometimes applied to the terminal reality as if that were the criterion apart from the practical situation. But truth in its only intelligible sense is a character of ideas, hypotheses, judgments, whatever involves intellectual statement, and its criterion is the worth of such statement as intellectual, *i. e.*, as

organizing blind action into victorious plan. The working of an idea is not cause of its truth; rather, such working is itself the truth of the idea. To say that the idea was true even before it succeeded can mean only that as a matter of fact it did succeed. The confusion in the use of the term truth is due to cases in which an idea does not cease to exist as idea as soon as it is made true, but functions in the development of other ideas. Ideas that have a constant or recurring function are 'eternal' truths, which however are not unchanging, but must live and grow on pain of becoming noisome and false.

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BOOKS RECEIVED FROM APRIL 5 TO MAY 5.

The Philosophy of Loyalty. J. ROYCE. New York and London, Macmillan, 1908. Pp. xv + 409.

La Pensée et les Choses. I. La connaissance et le jugement. J. MARK BALDWIN. Paris, Doin, 1908. Pp. xviii + 500. 4 fr.

Lessons of the Financial Crisis. Various authors. Philadelphia, Amer. Acad. Polit. and Social Science, 1908. Pp. vi + 233.

L'Idéal moderne, la Question morale. P. GAULTIER. Hachette, 1908. Pp. viii + 358. 3 fr. 50.

Croyance religieuse et Croyance intellectuelle. OSSIP-LOWRIÉ. Paris, Alcan, 1908. Pp. 176. 2 fr. 50.

Nursing the Insane. C. BARUS. New York, Macmillan, 1908. Pp. x + 409.

La Psychologie quantitative. J. J. VAN BIERVLIET. Gand, Siffer; Paris, Alcan, 1907. Pp. 219. 4 fr.

Antiquities of the Upper Gila and Salt River Valleys in Arizona and New Mexico. W. HOUGH. Washington, Gov. Print. Office, 1907. Pp. 96.

The Influence of Alcohol and other Drugs on Fatigue. Croonian Lectures. W. H. R. RIVERS. London, Arnold, 1908. Pp. 136.

The Application of Statistical Methods to the Problems of Psychophysics. F. M. URBAN. Philadelphia, Psychol. Clinic Press, 1908. Pp. ix + 220.

Historia de la Filosofía Española des los tiempos primitivos el

Siglo XII. A. BONILLA Y SAN MARTIN. Madrid, Suarez, 1908. Pp. 473. 8 pts.

The Will to Believe as a Basis for the Defense of Religious Faith. E. STETTMEIER. Arch. of Philosophy, No. 2. New York, Science Press, 1907. Pp. vi + 97.

NOTES AND NEWS.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES has sailed for Oxford, England, where he is to give a course of eight Hibbert lectures on Present-day Philosophy before Manchester New College. Before his departure he was presented with a handsomely bound copy of the volume of papers prepared in his honor by the members of the department of Philosophy of Columbia University. The volume has now been published by Longmans, Green & Co., under the title *Essays, Philosophical and Psychological*.

AT the George Washington University Williston S. Hough, Ph.M., has resigned from the department of philosophy and has been elected Professor of Psychology and Pedagogy. Edward E. Richardson, Ph.D., has been elected Instructor in Philosophy in the same University.

PROFESSOR J. J. McNULTY, of the College of the City of New York, was killed in an accident on May 1.

DR. I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY, late Johnston Scholar in the Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed professor of philosophy in Vassar College.

PROFESSOR ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, of Washington University, St. Louis, has accepted a call to the chair of philosophy in the University of Missouri.

THIS number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with philosophy, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor C. M. Bakewell.

THE following are taken from the press :

A NEW psycho-neurological institute, under the direction of Professor Bechterew, was recently opened at St. Petersburg.

MR. H. L. HOLLINGWORTH, assistant in psychology in Columbia University, has been appointed instructor in psychology in the University of Nebraska.

